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C hoosing the Law Governing Perfection:
Th~ Da ta and Politics of Article 9 Filing
SKev,e n L. Harris
Charles W. 1\f!ooney. Jr.*
In his valuable contribution to this Symposium, Lynn
LoPucki m akes a case for revising Article 9 to provide that the
proper place for filing a financing statement against a corporate
debtor is the jurisdiction under whose law the debtor is incorporated. 1 He marshals data that provide powerful support for his
proposal and effectively blunt anticipated criticisms. We are
:pleased to see this article, not only because we are inclined to
agree with its conclusion, but also because its appearance suppOl~ts one of the strengths of the UCC revision process.
As LoPucki acknowledges, his article is a direct outgrowth
of a process that began with the establishment of the Permanent
Editorial Board UCC Article 9 Study Committee. 2 He first publicly floated the idea of an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule

* The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, University of illinois
College of Law, and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
They serve as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 9
("Drafting Committee") and were the Reporters for the Permanent Editorial
Board UCC .A_rticle 9 Study Committee ("Study Committee"). The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee, the
Study Committee, or any of the sponsors of either (the Permanent Editorial
Board, the American Law Institute, or the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577
(1995). Although LoPucki's proposal encompasses not only corporations but
also limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and other chartered entit ies {"registered entities"), his discussion proceeds primarily in t he context of
corporate debtors. Id. at 581. We follow his practice.
2. Id. at 583-84. The Permanent Editorial Board established the Study
CoD:l.!-nit t<:e in early 1990. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BoARD FOR THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE, PEB STUDY GRouP, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE .A..RTICLE 9: REPORT 1 (1992) [hereinafter FEB REPORT]. The Report describes the reasons for
and background of the study and the organization, operation, and general approach of the Committee. I d. at 1-9. The Study Committee recommended that
the U CC's sponsors create a drafting committee for the revision of Article 9. I d.
at 10-11. The sponsors responded positively and created the Drafting Coilll.-nitte :: in 1993 . We expect that a revised .Article 9 \Vill be promulgated in 1997.
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in May 1993, at an Invitational Symposium sponsored by the
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee
on Continuing Professional Education. LoPucki was among a
select group of established and knowledgeable practitioners and
academics who were invited to participate in a wide-ranging discussion of the Study Committee's Report. 3 The primary purposes of the Report were to recommend to the sponsors of the
UCC whether Article 9 is in need of revision and, if so, to recommend the nature and substance of the revisions. 4 But, as
LoPucki's article suggests, the Report served as well to stimulate discussion of various proposals for revision. 5
IMPROVING UPON ARTICLE 9's BIFURCATED
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
The Study Committee's Report expressed dissatisfaction
with the current choice-of-law system. Under this system, the
law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located governs
perfection for most tangible collateral, whereas the law of the
jurisdiction where the debtor is located governs perfection for
most intangibles. 6 In explaining the desirability of a single
choice-of-law rule applicable to both tangible and intangible collater al, the R eport observed that following two rules often result s in multiple filings for a single transaction. 7 T he two-rule
r egime also jeopardizes security interests in proceeds and creates priority problems that a single rule would minimize and, in
some cases, even eliminate. 8
3. Because LoPucki is widely regarded as not terribly sympathetic to secured cr editors, the mixed reaction his idea received is some indication that the
alleged "capture" of the revision process by representatives of secured parties is
overstated.
4. PER REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
5. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 584. Discussions are continuing under the
au spices of the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute,
tr,.rou gh the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
a n d various state and local bar associations, as well as among the advisors and
obs ervers of the Drafting Committee.
6. "A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of business if he has one,
at his chief execut ive office if he has more than one place of business, otherwise
at his :residence." U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1990).
7. P E B REPORT, supra note 2, at 75. For example, financiers commonly
tak e a security interest in both inventory and accounts. The law of the location
of t he collateral governs wher e to file a financing statement with respect to inventmy. U.C .C. § 9-103(1)(b). The law (including the conflict-of-laws rules) of
the jurisdiction wher e the debt or is located governs where to file v.ith respect to
0\cccunts . Id . § 9 -103(3)(b).
8. PEB R EPORT , supra note 2, at 75.
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Several considerations led the Study Committee to conclude
that the singleehoice-of-law rule should turn on the location of
the debtor and not the location of the collateral. 9 First, intangible collateral has no location. A location-of-collateral r ule would
require a provision fixing a fictional location for intangibles.lo
Second, collateral may be located in many jurisdictions, whereas
each debtor has only one location (and, perhaps, one or two other
candidates for its location). As a consequence, a debtor's-location rule would likely result in fewer filings, thereby lowering
the cost of credit. Third, a debtor's-location rule probably would
not need special provisions governing collateral in transit. 11 Finally, because debtors are unlikely to change locations as frequently as does collateral, a debtor-based rule would likely
reduce the costs of maintaining perfected status and the frequency with which certain difficult priority issues arise.
The Report candidly acknowledged that a single choice-oflaw rule based on the location of the debtor is not a complete
solution to choice-of-law problems, even though it would reduce
many costs and much complexity.l 2 Because debtors sometimes
change their location, a debtor-based rule would not eliminate
all the costs and priority problems that accompany or result
from changes in the fact that determines the applicable law.
The Report also identified several problems that might accompany a shift from the current mixed choice-of-law regime (collateral- and debtor-based, depending on the type of collateral) to a
single, debtor-based rule. 1 3

CHOICE-OF-LAvV BASED ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE
DEBTOR'S INCORPORATION
LoPucki approves of and builds upon the Study Committee's
recommendations that Article 9 be revised to provide a single
choice-of-law rule and that the rule be tied to the debtor, rather
than the collateral.l 4 He brings to the discussion a new a nd im9. Id. at 76.
10. A rule that located intangibles at the debtor's location would 1·eplicate
the existing system.
11. See, e.g., U.C .C. § 9-103(1)(c) (governing purchase money security interests in collateral that the parties understand will be kept in another state).
12. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 77.
13. I d. We discuss some of these problems. Se e infra notes 34-59 and accompanying text (discussing the variety of a dvers e implications associated with
the change to a debtor-ba sed rule).
14. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, § 9.A. The Study Committee's recommendations were not novel. They were in accord with those of others 'Yvho previously had considered t he issue. See, e.g.) RusSELL J. vVEINTRAU B, COMMENTARY
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portant twist, suggesting that the governing law be that of the
jurisdiction under whose law the debtor is incorporated rather
than the jurisdiction in which the debtor's chief executive office
is located.l 5 LoPucki does not limit his analysis to the question
of whether an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule is preferable to one based on the location of the debtor's chief executive
office . . His paper also illuminates the larger question of the desirability of switching from a mixed choice-of-law regime to a
single choice-of-law rule.
At least insofar as it relates to the law governing pe:rfection,16 this larger choice-of-law question is, in turn, but one aspect of an overriding issue in the revision process: How to
minimize the aggregate costs of the filing system. 17 LoPucki's
principal claim is that "[t]he benefits of the change to a n incorporation-based sysem will be principally in the form of lower total
systems costs and greater accuracy," and his proposal should be
assessed on this basis.l 8 We do not share LoPucki's concern that
a particular rule might permit filers to externalize certain costs
by shifting them to searchers, or vice versa. 19 As a practical
matter, filers, searchers, and debtors are unable to bargain
among themselves to reallocate the costs of the filing system.
Regardless ofhow Article 9 allocates the costs between :filers and
searchers, each group can shift the loss to its customers. Ultimately, debtors and potential debtors will bear both the costs of
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 8.42, at 503-04 (3d ed. 1986) (promoting th8 merits
of a debtor-based rule); Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 I-IAKv. L.
REv. 477 , 556-57 (1973) (arguing that a debtor-based rule would eliminate
problems creat ed by the location-of-collateral approach); Friedrich K. Juenger,
Nonpossessory Security Interests in American Conflicts Law, 84 CoM. L .J. 63 , 74
(1979) (advocating a debtor-based rule except for cars or fixtures).
15. LoPucki contrasts his proposal, filing "where the debtor is incorp orated," with the current regime, under which one files "where the debtor is located" or ·\vhere the collateral is located." LoPuc:!r..i, supra note 1, at 585-93.
Because the location of a corporation is a legal l'iction, we would pl:1rase the
issue in terms of whether A...rticle 9 should deem a corpor ation to be kcated at
its chief 8xecutive office or in the jurisdiction of its incorporation.
16. Under § 9-103, the law governing perfection of secm·ity illt8l·ests als o
governs "the effect of perfection," wr..ich many understand t o m ean the relative
priority of a security interest as against other claims to the collateral. U.C.C.
§ 9-103(6) (1994). A 199L1 amendment to § 9-103(6) distinguishes between <;h;:;
law governing perfection and t he law goven•ing pr iority •Nith n;spect to s.scuri··
ties. ld.
17. The aggregate costs include those imposed upon both s 2cu.:red and \.CDsecm-.ed creditors, as well as upo11 buyers and transferees of the colJc::,.tel"al and
other interested persons who consult the UCC filing records .
18. See LoPucki, supra note l , at 652.
19. See id. at 601.
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filing (or choosing not to file) and the costs of searching (or deciding not to search) . No advantage is necessarily gained by creating rules that, in t he first instance, impose u pon the filer the
costs of its own errors. The goal instead becomes one of reducing
the aggregate costs of both aspects of the filing system.
Cost reduction is not the only goal of the revision process.
The nurnose of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Unif~rm~State Laws (NCCUSL), one ofthe sponsors ofthe UCC,
is "to promote uniformity in the law among the several
States." 2 0 E specially in light of the general acceptance of existing Section 9-103, 21 the Article 9 Drafting Committee is unlikely t o approve any change to the section that it believes is
likely to impair significantly the chances of enactment or to result in non-uniform amendments. 22
The Study Committee's Report outlines some of the potential cost savings that might result from switching to a single
choice-of-law rule determined by the location of the debtor's
chief executive office. LoPucki argues, in essence, that an incorpor ation-based choice-of-law rule would afford all the benefits of
:m ovi ng to a chief executive office rule and then some.
Th 2 advantages of linking the location of a corporate debtor
to its jurisdiction of incorporation rather than to its chief executive office cannot be denied. Once one has identified the debtor,
the ju.:risdiction of incorporation is certain and easy to confirm
from th e pu blic :record; the location of the chief executive office is
less certain and depends on private facts that may be costly to
,,~Ari
. _,_

Pv .23

- - ~ - .;

20. CoNSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE oF CoMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS § 1.2 (1988).
21 . There have been very few nonuniform amendments to § 9~103.
22. .A crwng NCCUSL's policies is the following: "(a) Every act drafted by
th2 Conference shall conform to the following r equirements: ... (2) there shall
b.~ a rea sonable probability that the act, when appr oved, either will be accepted
a:nd : :nacted into law by a sub stan tial number of jurisdictions or, if not, will
pTomot e uniformity indirectly." NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON
U NIFORM STATE LAws, STATEMENT oF PoLicY EsTABLISHING CRITERIA AND P ROCEDURE S FOR DESIGNATION AND CoNSIDERATION OF AcTs '!! 2(a)(2) (1988). To the
.:G~t ent that nommiformity imposes net costs , the goal of uniformity is one as ~
p 2ct of the goal of cost reduction.
23. LoPucki m akes much of this uncertainty, some of which the official
comDJ 21T~ creates. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 594-97. The Study Committee's
R eport aelr..nowledged the uncertainty but observed that "[a ]lthough the term
[chi:?? e~~scutive office] is not defined, the lack of definition does not appear to
ha·I2 C8.usecl sig:.rJi:iJ.cant problems ." PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 76 n .8. Pre ~
.:ouio.a.bJy, t}1e u n certainty, what ever its degTee, could be ameliorated by care(\."t)Jy reclca?ting t h e statute and the official comments. Nevertheless , LoPucki's
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POST-TRANSACTION CHANGES UNDER AN
INCORPORATION-BASED CHOICE-OF-LA\V RULE
The incorporation-based system may not be quite so simple
as it first appears. For example, the rule may have to take account of corporations that dissolve. Because the consequences of
dissolution differ from state to state, a complex provision may be
needed to deal with the variations. As LoPucki suggests, an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule is likely to be useful not
only for corporations but also for other "registered entities."24
More thought must be given to the applicability of the "jurisdiction of incorporation" rule to entities other than state-chartered
corporations. 25 In particular, care must be taken to assure that
no "registered entity" can be chartered by more than one jurisdiction. And, unless Congress establishes a federal filing system
for federally chartered entities, the choice-of-law rule governing
security interests created by some registered entities will differ
from that governing security interests created by others. 26 In
any event, the definition of "registered entity" will raise some
questions at the margin. These and other issues deserve further
study; we suspect, however, that they will prove trivial when
compared with the increased certainty that would result from
abandoning the chief executive office as a determinant of the applicable law.
We agree with LoPucki that the costs of discovering andresponding to changes in the jurisdiction whose law governs
perfection are likely to be lower in an incorporation-based system than under a rule that turns on t h e location of t he debtor's
chief executive office. A change in the jurisdiction of incorporation is a matter of public record and occurs at a definite time. 27
point is well taken: The jurisdiction of incorporation is more certain and easier
to verify than is any undefined "chief executive office" or any redefined "chief
executive office."
24. For a worbng definition of "registered entity," see LoPucki, supra note
1, at 581 n.12.
25. The 1977 amendments to§ 9-103 use the phrase "jurisdiction of organization." See D.C. C. § 9-103(6) (1977). One of the nevv choice-of-law provisions
applicable to securities uses the phrase "jurisdiction under which the issu er of
the security is organized." U.C. C. § 8 -llO(d) (1994).
26. It will be necessary to specify the applicable law in the case offederallychartered entities. We fb.ink it unlikely, however, that states would adopt a
uniform text that deems a specified jurisdiction (say, Washington, D.C.) to be
the home of all federally-chartered entities. A...rwther alternative for fede rallyehartered entities would be the jurisdiction where the chief executive office is
located, as under current UCC § 9-103(3).
27. Following LoPucki, we use the pr..rase "change in the jurisdiction of incorporation" to refer to a reincorporation. Although the purpose and practical
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A debtor may change its chief executive office through the accretion of otherwise insignificant private events, thus making the
moment of change-a legally significant event-impossible to
pinpoint. 28 An incorporation-based rule may reduce significantly the monitoring costs that arise from the current need to
reperfect if the debtor relocates its chief executive office or
reincor porates. 29
To some degree, our assessment of these monitoring costs
differs from LoPucki's. For example, we agree that an incorporation-based rule could eliminate the need to monitor for corporate restructurings, but we think that revisions to Article 9
would be insufficient to accomplish that goal. LoPucki assumes
that the change in choice-of-law rules would be accompanied by
a revised section 9-402(7), under which a filed financing statement would remain effective if the debtor corporation changes
its name or even merges out of existence. 30 He suggests that
t his new rule would eliminate the need for a secured party who
file s properly in t he jurisdiction of incorporation to monitor for
subsequent mergers. 31 But a merger, particularly one in which
the debtor merges out of existence, poses risks that may dwarf
the loss of perfected status. Even if a filing were to remain effective following a reincorporation, secured parties would be likely
to t ake steps t o discover whether the debtor has merged. These
steps might include checking the publicly available corporate
records periodically to discover whether particular debtors had
undergone corporate changes .
.A. n incorporation-based choice-of-law rule might facilitate
the transmission of relevant information to secured parties and
thereby obviate the n eed for periodic searches, a point that
LoPu.cki seems to overlook. For example, once a state links its
corporate and UCC records, the filing office might, for a fee, roueffect of a 1·eincorporation are to change the domicile of a corporation, as a legal
matter a reincorporation consists of the organization of a new corporation and
the subsequent mer ger of the old corporation into the n ew. Legally, the old
corporation does not change its jurisdiction of incorporation; rather, it ceases to
exist. The new (surviving) corporation remains liable for debts incnued by the
old one.
23. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 590-91.
29. Icl. at 611-14. The incorporation-based system also provides a means
for enor tl·a.Dning. !d. a t 603.
30. !d. ~t 614. Although LoPucki treats a reincorporation as a name
change, 8. reincorpo:ration terminates the existence of an original corporation.
See su,prc; note 27 and accompanying text (discussing t he legal effect of
reincorporation) . We prefe2· to think of reincorporations not as name changes
but rather as transfers of collateral.
31 . LoPucki, supra note 1, at 611 -14.
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tinely notify the secured party of record that its debtor plans to
merge. Or corporate law might be amended to accomplish the
same result indirectly. If, for example, the law prevented a proposed merger from taking effect until outstanding financing
statements are terminated, the debtor would have little choice
but to inform the secured party prior to merging. Alternatively,
the effectiveness of a proposed merger could be conditioned upon
refiling the outstanding financing statements against the surviving corporation.
Although LoPucki does not address mergers generally, the
incorporation-based choice-of-law rule he proposes may help resolve some perfection issues that arise in that context. Despite
having devoted substantial time, the Study Committee was unable to reach a consensus on whether a financing statement filed
against the debtor should remain effective with respect to collateral that a surviving corporation acquires after merging with
the non-surviving debtor. 32 Part of the Committee's disagreement stemmed from diverging views over whether to impose
upon a post-merger lender to the surviving entity the burden of
discovering a financing statement filed against the now-defunct
debtor, or whether to impose upon the lender to the debtor the
burden to discover that its borrower has merged out of existence
and to correct the UCC records. Those with concern for the
searcher note that although the merger and the identity of the
debtor (including its state of incorporation) may be part of the
public record, the location of the debtor's chief executive office,
where a relevant financing statement might be filed, is not.
Under an incorporation-based regime, however , the burden on
potential lenders to the surviving entity would be considerably
reduced. 33
As with initial filings, the benefits of an incorporation-based
rule with r espect to maintaining perfected status are apparent.
There are, however, some disadvantages . Chief among them is
that an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule may engender
complex substantive rules that depend on whether t he debtor is
a registered entity, or a particular type of registered entity. Fo:r
example, LoPucki suggests that an incorpo:ratior1-based :rule
would obviate the need to refile when the debtor eorpo:rat ion
32. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, §§ 17.E-F. This question assumes that a
security has attached to the property acquired after the merge;_-.
33. The fact that UCC filings vastly outnumber seaTches of t h e UCC
records, see LoPucki, supra note 1, at 615, also argues for imposing t he burden
on lenders to the survivor rather than on those who have filed against the
debtor.

.l

1

l
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changes its name; presumably, the need to refile to maintain
perfected status would remain with respect to debtors other
than r egistered entities. 34 Similarly, under an incorporationbased rule , a refiling might not be necessary following a
reincor poration, whereas it might be required in analogous situations, such as the incorporation of a limited partnership.35
These potential statutory wrinkles, although worthy of note, are
unlikely to impose costs substantial enough to offset the obvious
advantages of an incorporation-based rule.36

FROM A MIXED CHOICE-OF LAW REGIME TO A DEBTORBASED SYSTEM: POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND
LIKELIHOOD OF NONUNIFORMITY
LoPucki's article is not limited to the question of whether an
incorporation-based rule is preferable to one based on the
debtor's chief executive office. The article also provides a useful
analysis and supporting data that are likely to aid the Drafting
Committee in evaluating the larger questions : .Are t he anticipated benefits of a shift from a mixed choice-of-law regime to a
single debtor-based r ule (whether keyed to jurisdiction of incorporation or to chief executive office) likely to exceed the expected
costs? Vlill the state legislatures enact a proposed uniform incorporation -based choice-of-law rule?
The Study Committee's Report raised the u nifonnity issue
by observing that a single choice-of-law rule based upon the
debtor's chief executive office "may affect dramatically the volume of :filings in many jurisdictions. The perceived effect may be
so g-reat as to engender opposition among filing officers in particular jurisdictions."37 Switching to an incorporation-based system noses the issue in even starker terms. The immediate
:reaction of virtually everyone with whom we have shared
LoPu cki's proposal is t he same: Delaware ;,vill experience a t1ood
34. The Study Committee contemplated that a new filing generally would
be needed to continue perfected status following name changes. See PEB REPORT, suora note 2, §§ 17.B-C . The Drafti ng Committee generally has followed
~"h_e '"'t
' •__,oLl:lillH
r<
. 't ee ' s approacn.
i:J uo.y
35. The "incorporation of a partnership," like a reinco:rporation, is a t ransfe:r of assets from one entity to a noth er.
36. The tension between drawing fine, but complex, lines and effectuating
rough justice is a problem that is not uPique to choice-of-law issues. See Steven
L. HE:ri;3 & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report:
.:Strong Signals and l-Iard Choices , 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 577-80 (1992-93) (discussing the tension bet-ween developing a complex set of :ru.les to create cert ai:..'lty of commercial law and maintaining cla.>ity and accessibility).
37. PEE RE PORT, sup r c note 2, § 9.A.2.
1
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of filings, at the expense of other states. Not so long ago, when
Louisiana was considering adopting Article 9, the effort to replace Louisiana's parish-based recording system with a statewide filing system was met with potent, and ultimately
successful, opposition from local filing officers. Many fear that
state filing officers would mount the same opposition to the proposed change in choice-of-law rules.38
Everyone recognizes that, to some extent, this issue is "amenable to empirical clarification." 39 Unlike the rest of us, however, LoPucki began the clarification process. He deserves
immeasurable credit for compiling and analyzing the data.
Even if his empiricism fails to carry the day, LoPucki has perfo rmed a valuable service by informing what otherwise would
have been debate premised entirely upon speculation.
LoPucki's data suggest t hat other states would lose to Delaware, on average, about five percent of their filings, with an estimated annual revenue approaching two million dollars. 40 We
cannot predict whether the data will persuade an otherwise dubious filing officer that fears oflosing substantial revenue to Delaware are unwarranted. The sticking point ultimately may turn
out to be perception rather than fact. We would not be surprised
to hear that some filing officers "just can't believe" that the loss
of revenue to Delaware would be as small as LoPucki projects.
Moreover, the losses that LoPucki projects are averages; some
states, such a s those that impose a tax on filings, might expect to
incur a larger than average loss. 41 Although LoPucki may well
be correct that thwarting the imposition of documentary taxes
by moving to an incorporation-based system would be a good result for t he Article 9 system, officials in states that impose a tax
might vigorously oppose the change nonetheless.
The potential r edistribution of revenue is not the only problem ; a reduct ion in the aggregate number of filings in the UCC
:recor-ds will accom pany t he change from a mixed choice-of-law
system t o a single, debtor-based choice-of-law rule. For example, inventory financers who n ow must perfect by filing in each
jurisdiction where collateral is locat ed would be able to perfect
by making a single filing in the jurisdiction of incorporation.
38. OnB person has questioned wheth er Delaware's filing syst em has th e
capacity to process so many more fi lings.
39. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 584.
40. Jd. at 639.
n. See icl. at 630-32.
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From a cost-savings perspective, the reduction in filings seems
desirable. But politically, it may add fuel to the fire.42
The stakes here are much higher than those in the battle
between state and local filing offices within a state.43 Maintaining different rules on where to file within a state is far from an
ideal situation. It imposes information-gathering costs on those
who use the filing system. The third alternative Section 9401(1) may require the additional expense of a second filing
within a single state. Putting aside statutory ambiguities, however, one can definitively determine "where to file" no matter
which filing office or offices each state designates. 4 4 Not so if
disgruntled filing officers convince particular states not to adopt
the proposed uniform choice-of-law rule. With non-uniform
choice-of-law rules, in many cases no one will know in advance
which state's law determines whether a security interest is
perfected. 45
Yet LoPu cki flags a potentially even greater problem. Because corporate debtors often can change t heir domicile more
easily than their chief executive office, jurisdictions that adopt
the uniform incorporation-base d choice-of-law rule might compete for incorporations by enacting non-uniform substantive
r ules favorable to secured parties.46 To some extent, the u niform version could reduce the effect of this non uniformity by divorcing the law governing perfection from the law governing
42. In the absence of filing data from all 50 states, it may be impossible to
estimate the number of filings that would be eliminated by moving to a single
choice-of-law rule.
43. The three alternative § 9-401(1) urovide a m enu from which each sta te
may choose how much local filing it wish'es . LoPucki argues for elimination of
local filing except for real estate related collateral such as :fixtures. LoPucki,
supra note 1, at 657. As far as we are aware , no individual or group fa vors
retention of local filing, other than one with a direct or indirect interest in the
revenues that local filing generates.
44. We do not mean to trivialize the uncertainty costs caused by ambiguities in the existing formulation of the three alternatives to § 9-401(1). For a
discussion of the ambiguities, see, e.g., BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRA.t'ISACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE§ 2.12, at 2-14L1 to 2-149
(rev. ed. 1993); JM1ES J. WHITE & RoBERT S. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL
ConE§ 22-14 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993).
45. For examples of how this uncertainty can come about, see LoPucb,
supra n ote 1, a t 646-47 .
46. For example, a state might delete § 9-301(1), which subordinates unperfected security interests to the rights of certain lien creditors, buyers, and
transferees. AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE RE\TISED
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES (WITH A.lVIENDMENTS TO -~~'{TI CL E 9. SECURED TRANSACTIONS) (Proposed Final Draft 1994).
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priorities. 47 But this solution, which could exacerbate the
problems of conflicting priority rules, is far from ideal.
To date, individual states have largely refrained from
adopting non-uniform Article 9 choice-of-law provisions. The
change to an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule presents two
risks: nonuniformity resulting from particular states refusing
to shift to an incorporation-based choice-of-law r u le, and
nonuniformity resulting from particular states adopting nonuniform rules of substantive law in an effort to attract corporations. Whether those risks warrant rejection of what othe;wise
may be a desirable rule is a determination the Drafting Committee ultimately will have to make. LoPucki's article enables them
to make it with at least some factual basis.

TRANSITION PROBLEMS
Related to the problem of nonuniformity in legislative enactments of Section 9-103 or particular substantive pro-visions of
Article 9 is the nonuniformity that results from delays in adopting statutory revisions. Nonuniformity of this kind h as
presented problems in the past and will likely do so in t he future. 48 Even if all states adopt the uniform version t o t ake effect
on the same effective date, transition provisions woul d be necessary to deal with the status of financing statements that >.Nere
properly filed but not in the jurisdiction of incor por ation . vV.e
commend LoPucki for t ackling this problem, and, notwit hsta n d··
ing the federal government's uneven efforts in this r egard, 49 vve
u rge all concerned to keep an open mind about a federal ch oice47 . New Article 9 draws this distinction.

Compare , e.g., § 9-103(6 )(b)

(1 994) (providing that local law generally governs perfection and priorit y of a
security intet·est in a security certificate located in the jurisdiction) with § 9 103(6)(D (providing that the law of t he jurisdiction in which the debtor is lo-

cated governs perfection by certain methods).
48. For example, § 9-103 wa s amended in 1977 to provide that the law Uncludirw the conflict oflaws rules) of the iurisd.iction of orgmlization o:fthe issuer
goverr~s perfection of a security interest"in an uncertificated secu.- ity . The 1972
version pr ovided that perfection of a security interest in the same collateral is
governed by t he law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction in
which the debtor is located. The 1994 version contains a set of choice-o f~1aw
rules that differs :from both. See U.C. C. §§ 8-110, 9-103(6) (199<b).
49. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Good Faith T ransferees of U.S. Treo. sury Securities and Other Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial Law, 23
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 715 (1993) (criticizing t h e United States Treasury De:pmt ··
m ent's efforts t o prom ulgate new r egulations cover ing book-entry T:c 2E\su..ry
securities).
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of-law statute. 5° Indeed, if federal intervention appears likely,
NCCUSL might seek to delay legislative consideration of revised
section 9-103 until Congress has acted.5 1

PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS
Another issue that may have implications for uniformity as
well as for cost reduction is the effect of an incorporation-based
system on purchase money financing of equipment. The Study
Committee expressed concern that:
[a] change to the ''location-of-the-debtor" [i.e., chief executive office]
rule might require certain financers to teach their personnel how to
determine where the debtor is located (a determination that may be
considerably more difficult than determining where the newly-acquired collateral is) and how to prepare and file financing statements
that satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirements of a larger
number of jurisdictions.52

LoPucki suggests that determining the applicable law by reference to t he jurisdiction of incorporation rather than the chief executive office would ameliorate the problem substantially. The
jurisdiction of incorporation is verifiable from the public record
and is information that many purchase money financers obtain
in t he ordinary course of extending credit. Nevertheless, some
purchase money financers have displayed the same concern
about the costs of a n incorporation-based rule that the Study
Committee expressed in its Report. 5 3
LoPucki reports that "[m]any, if not most, UCC filings are
purchase money security interests created at the time a manufacturer or dealer sells the collateral to an end user or retaile:r."54 Reducing filing costs for purchase money financers,
both lenders and sellers, would therefore be a particularly effec50. For example, under t h e Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101432, § 5, lOLl Stat. 963, 973-75, amending§ 17a of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the
power t o issue preemptive federal regulations concerning the transfer and
pledge of interests in securities. O ne alternative cWTently under consideration
by the lVIarket Transactions Advisory Committee (established under t he Market Reforrn Act of 1990) is a federal choice-of-law rule .
51 . Cong-.ress might, at the same time, create a filing system for federally
cha.rtered registered entities .
52. PEB REPORT, suDra note 2, at 77.
53. These eoncerns,- which have been expressed to us privately and at
Dr::;.fting Committee meetings, go not only to the costs attendant to the transition from one choice-of-law rule to anot h er but also to the costs of operating
under the incorporation-based rule.
54. LoPuck:i, supra note 1, at 587. A purcha se money financer can obtain
priority over a competing security interest in the sam e equipment even if the
competing seemed party is fiTst to file its financing stat ement . S ee U.C.C. § 9 -

1'
l

676

lvfiNNESOTA. LAvV REVIEW

lV ol. 79:663

tive means of reducing the aggregate costs of the filing system.
LoPucki suggests that the jurisdiction of incorporation may be
less costly to ascertain than the location of the collateral, but his
discussion pr oceeds on the assumption that "the careful secured
party will want to look at them to be sure they are in the
state." 55 In fact, as a general matter, purchase money financers
often do not incur the costs associated with visiting the debtor's
premises to verify the location of collateral. Apparently they do
not perceive a substantial risk in relying upon the debtor for this
information. 56 Nevertheless, the cost of verifYing the jurisdiction in which the debtor is incorporated may well be less than
the costs of being unperfected when the debtor turns out to have
given incorrect information. Moreover, the switch to a single
rule, whether based on incorporation or on chief executive office,
would eliminate any need to determine whether goods are "ordinary goods" or "mobile goods." 57
Determining where to file is not the end of the inquiry.
Purchase money financers also must incur the costs of discovering and complying with the filing requirements of t he appropr iate jurisdiction. Here, LoPucki's data suggest that a ch a n ge in
t he choice-of-law determinant from the current mixed system to
an incorporation-based system would result in a small (less than
t hree percent) increase in the number of out-of-state fi lings
against corporations .5 8 More refined da ta, which s egrega te
purchase money equipment filings, might show a somewhat different picture. Moreover, LoPucki's analysis treats ever y out-ofstate filing as equivalent, regardless of which states a re in volved
in t h e transaction. An equipment dealer in Kansas City , Missouri, might, however, not be indifferen t between fili ng in Ka n sas and filing in New York.
312(4) (1994). Thus, purchase money secured parties typically do n ot search
the DCC records.
The extent to which the prevalence of purchase money filings accoun ts for
t he significant disparity between the nur:.:1ber of filings and the number of
sea rches is a n empirical question well worth pursuing.
55. LoPucki , supra not e 1, at 593.
56. One can imagine a clas s of sellers whose business is entirely loca l, su ch
t h at there is at best a trivial risk that the buy er will remove the goods to a noth er sta te .
57. U nder§ 9-103(l)(b), the law of the jurisdictic,n in which the collateral is
located governs perfection of a security interest in "ordinary goods ," as defin ed
in § 9-103(l)(a). In contrast,§ 9-103(3)(b) provides that the law of th e juris diction wh ere the debtor is located governs perfection of a security interest in "mobile goods," as defin ed in § 9-103(3)(a).
58. LoPu cki, supra note 1, at 608.
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The largest cost associated with an out-of-state filing probably is the cost of determining how to comply with the peculiar
formal requirements for an effective financing statement. Some
of these requirements, such as minimum type size, have been
cr eated administratively by filing officers. Even nonuniform
statutory requirements, such as t he need for a tax identification
number, impose a dditional costs on filers. The most efficient solution, and one that the Drafting Committee is considering, may
be the development of a standard form of financing statement
that every jurisdiction will a ccept for filing.
Finally, purchase money financers have expressed concern
about maintaining perfection if the circumstances that determine the applicable law change after a financing statement has
been filed. Arguably, the movement of collateral is easier to spot
than the relocation of a chief executive office, let alone a
reincorporation, which is largely a paper transaction. But, as
discussed above, an incorporation-based system can address this
problem in one or more ways.59

COI'-TCLUSION
Consistent with the Study Committee's recommendation, a
consensus within the Drafting Committee has emerged in favor
of a single debtor-based choice-of-law rule for Article 9 filing .
Professor LoPucki's article pushes the envelope beyond that consensus. He has fas hion ed a cogent and articulate proposal for
an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule based on careful analysis, sound assumptions , and empirical data . That proposal also
appears to h ave fo und pr<::liminary support within the Drafting
Committee. 'I'o be sure, some underbrush stands between
LoPucki's proposal and statutory enactment; in this Commentary we have sought to illu:rninate it and clear some of it away.
But as Reporters for the 1.1.\:rt icle 9 revision project, 1Ne appreciate
enormously the path that Professor LoPucki has opened.

59. For 8X2L.'1ple , Articl e 9 might provide that r efiling is not required if the
debtor merges into another corpor ation: stat e corpor ate law might require notification of secured parties as a con dition t o m er ger; st at e filing offices might
agree to no ti t)- sectu·ed parties of n1e:-cge:rs ; or priva~ e se a~:·ch services r:..11.ight undertake to monitor cm-porate r ecor ds to discover mergeTs. S ee supra notes 3033 and accompanyin g text (exploring <:~lte rnative meth ods of r educing th e bur den on secured parties under an ine:orporatio:n-bas ed choice-of-l aw r-ule).

